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Home/Research Paper Library/Can LLMs Separate Instructions From Data? And What Do We Even Mean By That?

Can LLMs Separate Instructions From Data? And What Do We Even Mean By That?

Formalised the instruction-data separation problem underlying prompt injection and showed that capability gains do not solve it.

instruction-data separationformalisation

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